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There has been a slow, but growing 
awareness among external actors that some 
local non-state security actors should be 
involved in security governance in conflict-
affected situations. Already in 2006, the OECD 
published a report that called for a ‘multi-
layered’ approach to reforming actors and 
institutions that provide security and justice 
services (Scheye and McLean, 2006). Often 
these actors consist of local authorities, such 
as customary chiefs, village elders, or 
business people working in collaboration with 
different kinds of self-defense groups. The 
idea behind ‘multi-layered’ security 
governance is that the inclusion of local non-
state actors in security governance will 
improve security provision to people because 
they have more legitimacy. But in reality 
‘multi-layered’ security governance is often 
marked by conflict and competition as much 
as by collaboration and common solutions to 
people’s security problems.  
In this policy brief we highlight some of the 
opportunities and challenges of ‘multi-layered’ 
security governance in conflict-affected situations 
through a study of how it works in the Ituri 
Province located in north-eastern DR Congo. 
Between 1999 and 2003, Ituri was the scene of 
one of the most horrific episodes of the Congo 
Wars that led to the death of more than 55,000 
people and displaced several million (HRW, 
2003). This prompted the European Union to 
intervene in support of the United Nations peace-
keeping mission in DR Congo in 2003. One year 
later, the international Criminal Court indicted four 
of the leaders of Ituri’s armed groups. But violent 
conflict and insecurity persisted especially in the 
rural areas until 2007, when the leaders of main 
armed groups joined the Congolese army after 
military pressure from MONUC and the 
Congolese army (Fahey, 2013).  
Multi-layered security governance 
in Bunia 
In spite of the end of the war the city of Bunia is 
still marked by high-level of insecurity, caused 
mainly by violent crime. To help improving 
security conditions international and local NGOs 
decided to support non-state actors in non-violent 
security provision. Caritas, The Diocesan Justice 
and Peace Commission, Interchurch Peace 
Council and Pax Christi,1  started a programme, 
which engaged the youth of Bunia in crime 
prevention. To this end, they created new youth 
groups called Participative Local Governance 
Committees (Comités locaux de gouvernance 
participative, CLGP). The objectives were to 
document and report security incidents in their 
neighbourhoods on a regular basis and to 
transform existing vigilante groups into non-
violent security providers. But the project was 
confronted with a number of challenges.  
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One of the biggest challenges was the clientilistic 
norms of security governance by Congolese state 
security forces. These norms cause insecurity 
among security forces and encourage personnel 
of all ranks to engage in illegal revenue-
generation activities, which in turn create 
insecurity among Congolese citizens. With 
patronage being a prevalent, but not all-
pervasive, feature of security governance in DR 
Congo, high-ranking security officials and 
politicians are engaged in a constant struggle to 
accumulate resources. As a result, Congolese 
security services are not organised into a single 
command structure. Instead they constitute a 
collection of different patron-client networks (Baaz 
and Verweijen, 2013).  
This helps to explain why security forces did not 
receive these new committees with great 
enthusiasm. Not only did they feel that these 
committees had stepped into their domain, they 
were also concerned that they would expose and 
denounce their illegal revenue-generating 
activities, which are a crucial support base of 
patronage networks within the security forces. In 
order to avoid conflict, donors stressed the 
importance of the civilian and non-violent 
character of the CLGPs and sought to improve 
the strenuous relationship between the youth and 
their neighbourhoods on the one hand and the 
Congolese security forces and politico-
administrative authorities on the other. This was 
done through the creation of an Urban Assembly 
(Assemblée Urbaine), which was held every 
trimester, where the various state security 
services (intelligence services, immigration 
services, the army, the police, the head of Ituri 
district) and MONUSCO were invited. 
In 2012 the CLGPs also began to reinforce and 
support existing local community alert systems.2 
Neighbourhood inhabitants were provided with 
megaphones, whistles, cans, and alarm bells so 
they could alert the youth and the security 
services when security incidents occurred. Donor 
funding for the project ended in 2013, but the 
CLGPs continue to monitor and document crime 
events up to today. The alarm system has been 
preserved and is supported by other actors in the 
neighbourhoods, including private businesses. In 
addition, the Urban Assemblies, where members 
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 Interview, head of Saïo neighbourhood, 26 September 
2015, Bunia; interview, assistant, Université Shalom de 
Bunia, 24 September 2015, Bunia. 
of the CLGPs show their reports on security 
incidents, and sensitise the security forces, are 
still taking place. 
Ideally this project should create a multi-layered 
security system, in which the different actors 
involved collaborate to improve security provision 
for Congolese citizens. And indeed, it seems that 
the project has had some positive effects. It has 
led to an improved documentation of security 
incidents, it has created a platform through which 
local communities can approach the Congolese 
security forces and authorities, and it has helped 
to create a new alert system. Following initial 
hesitation, the Congolese authorities also began 
to appreciate the collaboration CLGPs that 
provided them with valuable information.  
However, overall the effects are ambiguous. The 
relationship between local youths and the police 
remains tense. People are angry with the police 
not only because they often do not show up when 
a violent crime has been committed, but even 
more so because they are complicit in crime. 
Police officers are known to rent their guns to 
bandits and take part in armed robberies. At the 
same time, security forces are engaged in illegal 
revenue-generating activities. Moreover, the 
police can easily be bribed, which means that 
while criminals are often let go, innocent people 
are arrested or worse. And finally, security forces 
continue to impose self-invented infractions, fees 
and fines on people.  
It is hardly surprising therefore, that the CLGPs 
sometimes revert back to their former role as 
vigilantes and deal with insecurity themselves 
including by taking revenge on security officials.3 
But this kind of vigilante justice comes with 
serious risks as relatives or friends of victims of 
vigilante justice may seek vengeance. This can 
set in motion vicious cycles of tit-for-tat violence.4 
Besides, by documenting security incidents, these 
committees inevitably also reveal cases where 
the police or army have been involved, so 
youngsters express fear of reporting towards the 
public authorities, as “you never know who is 
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invited at the urban assemblies”.5 These 
dynamics create a general sense of distrust and 
suspicion by urban inhabitants towards the police 
and the army.6  
Multi-layered peacekeeping in 
Irumu territory 
MONUSCO has a very broad mandate to 
simultaneously protect the civilian population, 
neutralise armed groups, stabilize the country, 
and restore state authority in DR Congo. But it 
has proven extremely difficult to align these 
objectives, which has seriously tarnished its 
reputation. Yet, largely due to its failure to protect 
the population and the backlash this has 
produced, MONUSCO has been a vehicle for 
trying new approaches to security provision in 
conflict-affected areas. These include the use of 
more aggressive, “robust” peacekeeping, both in 
Ituri (2005-2007) and - under the auspices of the 
Force Intervention Brigade - in the Kivus (2013-
present), and by supporting and working with 
local non-state actors. In this way, MONUSCO 
has provided critical lessons on peacekeeping for 
the UN Security Council and the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which in 
recent publications recognise both the importance 
of local conflict drivers and the importance of 
strengthening local capacities to govern security 
(UNSC 2015). 
Irumu territory, which for several years has been 
the site of confrontation between the Congolese 
army, supported by MONUSCO and the FRPI 
militia on the other, is one of the places where a 
stronger collaboration with local non-state 
security actors has been tried in order to improve 
security provision for Congolese citizens. Here, 
MONUSCO has developed a number of initiatives 
to strengthen local capacities for security 
governance.  
The FRPI is the last remaining armed group from 
the Ituri war. Because of military operations 
directed against it, the group is highly fragmented 
and is no longer able to militarily control 
significant territory. It is fairly representative of a 
number of armed groups operating in eastern 
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Congo. Its authority is drawn from the historical 
grievances of a particular community – in this 
case the Ngiti –, which it claims to protect against 
neighbouring communities and the government. 
However, at the same time it is extorting and 
committing abuses against the same population it 
claims to protect. Strategies to tackle the FRPI 
have mainly consisted of a combination of 
demobilisation and military intervention. Several 
attempts were made by the Congolese 
government to negotiate a demobilization or 
military integration of the group. The latest rounds 
of negotiation took place in January 2015 and in 
May-June 2015, but both failed and were followed 
by military operations against the group, which 
reduced its military power and territorial control, 
but could not put an end to the cycle of conflict 
and violence. 
In order to better live up to its mandate and 
protect the civilian population, MONUSCO has 
created a number of initiatives aimed at 
mobilizing local actors in security provision and 
strengthening local conflict prevention capacity. 
As early as 2009 it launched ‘Joint Protection 
Teams’, the aim of which was to gather 
information about evolving security threats and 
socio-economic conditions on the ground, and 
produce recommendations to MONUSCO and the 
Congolese authorities. In addition, MONUSCO 
has created local ‘community alert networks’ as a 
means to improve communication between 
peacekeepers in case of imminent security risks. 
Other local protection mechanisms initiated and 
supported by MONUSCO are the ‘local protection 
committees’, which consists of local community 
leaders. The main objective of these committees 
is to create local capacity and ownership of 
security governance, and to transfer 
competences to local actors, including local 
decision making authorities, so they can take care 
of their own security needs in the long term.7 
The UN, and MONUSCO in particular, should be 
commended for attempting to forge a new path to 
improve security provision in Irumu. But as in the 
urban case of Bunia, it is doubtful that these 
“bottom-up” initiatives will prove to be a solution 
to the complex security problems that people are 
faced with there as they are severely limited by 
Congo’s patronage driven security governance. If 
anything, the challenges of multi-layered security 
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are even more daunting in a conflict zone such as 
Irumu. Several sources confirm that both the 
Congolese army and the FRPI extort the local 
population for revenue-generation and target 
people they see as complicit with the ‘enemy’.8 
Consequently, the population of Irumu is caught 
between a rock and a hard place. Moreover, 
neither side seem particularly interested in finding 
a durable political solution to the current 
stalemate. Several human rights groups, 
including Justice Plus and MONUSCO’s human 
rights section, have tried to sensitize the 
Congolese army and have developed a number 
of protection strategies, including advocacy and 
legal support to victims, but so far they have had 
limited effect on its conduct.9 Kinshasa is believed 
to aim at a military dismantling of the FRPI in 
order to demonstrate to the international 
community that maintaining stability is mainly a 
law-and-order issue rather than a political one 
(UN Group of Experts, 2015).10 At the same time, 
rumours are circulating that certain officers in the 
Congolese army are not interested in finding a 
solution to the problem as the operations against 
the FRPI inflate their budgets. Meanwhile, 
sources claim that political and community 
leaders from Irumu, including members of 
parliament, provide support to the FRPI and try to 
prevent a further demobilisation of the group 
because of its strategic importance as a reserve 
force for the Ngiti community and its political 
leaders.11 
MONUSCO’s scope of action thus is rather 
limited. When it comes to dealing with armed 
groups, MONUSCO is increasingly side-lined. 
This is problematic because, in spite of the claims 
of the Congolese authorities, the FRPI militia is 
not only a security problem, but also a political 
one, which needs a political solution. 
Institutionally, it is crippled by restrictive security 
rules. Armed convoys are required to take staff to 
areas where security incidents have occurred, 
which limits their flexibility and response speed. 
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This tends to alienate and anger local populations 
in Irumu.12 
Conclusion 
International actors’ efforts to provide security to 
Congolese citizens are confronted with daunting 
challenges, not least the clientilistic norms of 
security governance in the Congo. In response, 
they have developed new ways to improve 
security provision to Congolese citizens in Ituri. 
As the above examples reveal, it should be 
recognised though that “bottom-up” approaches 
to security should not be seen as the solution to 
the complex of problems.  
The grim reality of security governance in the 
Congo is that it is dominated by patron-client 
networks that are engaged in fierce struggles 
over resources and power and hence produce 
violence and insecurity. These networks traverse 
the usual boundaries between the public and the 
private domain and can stretch from the highest 
political level to the lowest ranking security 
officials. They are in other words social entities 
that profoundly shape the socio-political structure 
in the Congo.  
As anybody living in a fragile and conflict-affected 
area knows, security governance is a hyper-
sensitive political subject. This is so because it is 
ultimately about who can enforce a political order 
which corresponds to their own interests. 
International support to local non-state security 
actors is therefore likely to create reluctance, 
suspicion and resistance among existing security 
actors, benefitting from the status quo. The 
attitude of the Congolese government to 
MONUSCO’s role in the neutralisation of armed 
groups in Irumu and elsewhere, and that of the 
Congolese security forces toward the CLGPs in 
Bunia should be seen in this light. This is why 
non-state security actors are not just a-political 
elements, which can be added to existing ones, 
so as to create multi-layered security governance. 
This is a simplistic and functionalist myth. In 
reality this configuration of multi-layered security 
is characterised by competition and distrust as 
much as by collaboration and the search for 
common solutions to shared security problems. 
External actors should be aware therefore that 
support to non-state security actors can create 
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further competition in the field of security 
governance. By extension it should be recognised 
that non-state actors may be caught up in the 
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